Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising from a Prior Asylum Claim by Petrini, Kenneth R.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 4 Article 11
4-1-1981
Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution
Arising from a Prior Asylum Claim
Kenneth R. Petrini
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth R. Petrini, Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising from a Prior Asylum Claim, 56 Notre Dame L. Rev. 719
(1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss4/11
Basing Asylum Claims on a Fear of Persecution Arising
from a Prior Asylum Claim
1. Introduction
It is well established that Congress has the power to legislate on matters
concerning immigration. ' To this end, Congress has provided, through a series of
laws, 2 for the entry of a limited number of aliens as immigrants.3 These immi-
grants must satisfy specific requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (INA).4 For those aliens who cannot meet these requirements, the Act
provides alternative relief in the form of refugee and asylee status for aliens who
face persecution if returned to their country of origin.5
Recently, the question has arisen whether an alien who has sought and been
denied asylum can enter a renewed asylum claim, using as its basis a fear of
persecution arising because his original asylum claim was viewed as a political
statement in his home country.
6
The alien who has an asylum claim denied will be subject to exclusion or
deportation. 7 He may claim, however, that deportation or exclusion will subject
him to the danger of losing his life or freedom." The alien may claim that he is
subject to persecution by his home country because he has claimed asylum.9 He
may then file a second asylum claim based solely on a fear of persecution result-
I Se, The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892);
C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, I IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-33 to 1-34 (1980). Such a power
has also been held to be an essential attribute of sovereignty. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
(1953); Makin v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1923); United States v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904); The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 581.
2 C. GORDON, supra note 1, at 1-6 to 1-32.4.
3 The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, has set the annual ceiling for immigrant
visas at 270,000.
4 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503. Section 1153(a) sets forth six preference categories based on relationship to
present citizens, professional skills, and work skills that are needed in the United States. Immigrant visas
are allocated on a set percentage basis among these preference groups with any excess being allocated to
non-preference immigrants.
5 INA §§ 207, 208 (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157, 1158). Refuge and asylum
differ in that refuge is limited in number and asylum is not. The numerical limit for refugee admissions is
set at 50,000 annually for 1980, 1981, and 1982. For those years, and for each year thereafter, these
numbers can be increased by the President prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, INA § 207(a), or
during the year in case of an emergency, INA § 2017(b). Section 208 is silent as to any limits on the number
of asylees.
6 The issue was raised by Judge Lawrence King in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, No. 79-2086
(S.D. Fla. July 2, 1980). The case was brought as a class action on behalf of 5000 Haitians who sought
relief from deportation orders entered against them after their asylym claims were denied. Id at 1. While
King decided the case on procedural grounds, see id. at 22, he outlined in depth the persecution that he
found existed in Haiti, id at 44-57.
7 See notes 14-15 infra.
8 Unless the alien is a refugee under INA section 207, his main avenue of relief is to apply for asylum.
INA § 208 (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158). The procedures for entering an asylum
claim are found at 8 CF.R. § 208.2 (1981). Application is made with the district director of the INS or
with an immigration judge, depending on the alien's status at the time of filing the claim. Id § 208.3.
Aliens making an asylum claim after the institution of exclusion or deportation proceedings file the re-
quests with the immigration judge, while all others file with the district director. Id
9 This problem arises with the Haitians, who are considered opponents of the President and traitors
to the Republic if they ask for asylum in the United States. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, Record at
45-46. This group may face long peri6ds of detention when returning to Haiti. Id at 52.
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ing from the denial of his first claim. It is the second claim that presents the
dilemma. There is a concern in our laws for anyone facing persecution, and a
concern that bona fide asylum seekers will choose not to apply for asylum lest
they be denied, and subsequently subjected to persecution for having made the
claim. On the other hand, the entire immigration system is noted for its quanti-
tative and qualitative criteria.10 It is a system of limited availability.
This note will explore the issue by looking at the statutory basis for asylum
as it relates to immigration law in general, and the conflicting policy considera-
tions which surround the specialized request for asylum. This note will then ex-
plore the application of asylum law to the situation of a specific group of aliens
who have gained national attention in recent years-emigrants from the Repub-
lic of Haiti. I I
The Haitians typify the dilemma created by this unresolved issue in asylum
law. They seek asylum status as a last-hope method of gaining entry into the
United States.1 2 Many of them come to the United States without the visa neces-
sary for entry as an immigrant,' 3 and therefore are subject to exclusion proceed-
ings which will deny them entry.' 4 Others have gained entry, legally or illegally,
but remain subject to expulsion through the deportation process. 15 From the
evidence presented in Haitian Refugee Center v. C'o'letti,16 it would appear that
those Haitians returned to Haiti after making an asylum claim are considered
traitors to the Republic.17 They face persecution in the form of imprisonment or
death. 18
II. Asylum Law in General
During the United States' first century, Congress did little to limit the immi-
gration of aliens.19 In its second century, however, the United States reversed its
earlier practice of openly admitting aliens and began to restrict the number of
immigrants that would be admitted.20 The Immigration and Nationality Act of
10 See notes 3-4 supra.
11 The recognized Haitian experience in the United States dates back at least to 1963. HOUSE SUB-
COMM. ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSI1P AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, HAITIAN
EMIGRATION 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as HAITIAN EMIGRATION]. The Haitians
who have not obtained entry visas before arriving in the United States face exclusion or deportation if they
are detected and apprehended. See notes 14-15 in/fa. Many of those will enter claims for asylum. Over
9000 Haitians had entered asylum claims as of December, 1979. Hearings, Select Commtission on Immigration
and ReAgee Poli, Transcript at 23 (Miami, Fla., Dec. 4, 1979) (testimony of Rev. Edward McCarthy). Of
these 9000, only 55 were successful. Id
12 For those fleeing persecution, three main types of relief are available under the INA. First, a lim-
ited number of those fleeing may be eligible for immigrant visas under INA § 203. Since this is limited to
20,000 per country per year, INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976), a large group could not be accom-
modated. Second, if the group is designated for refugee status, the aliens may enter as "section 207"
refugees. See note 42 infra. The third area of relief is asylum, which is determined on an individual basis,
see 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1981), without numerical limits. See note 5 supra.
13 8C.F.R.§211.1 (1980).
14 INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976) lists 33 grounds for exclusion. Those excluded are denied admis-
sion to the United States.
15 INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976) lists 18 classes of deportable aliens. An alien is subject to depor-
tation rather than exclusion if he is present in the United States.
16 Supra note 6.
17 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, Record at 45-46.
18 Id at 52.
19 C. GORDON, supra note 1, at 1-6. The only significant legislation restricting immigration was the
Alien Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 570, which expired after two years. Id at 1-18.
20 See id at 1-5.
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19522t established a system of national quotas22 and presented detailed grounds
for excluding and deporting aliens. 23 The INA also provided the forerunner of
today's refugee law.24 The 1965 amendments to the INA established the first
permanent statutory provision for refugees, 25 allowing an alien who faced perse-
cution three alternative forms of relief.26 They were: (1) "seventh-preference ref-
ugee" status; 27 (2) parole status;28 and (3) asylum, 29 which had no statutory basis,
but was derived from the Attorney General's regulations in 8 C.F.R. section
108.1. In response to several large influxes of aliens under provisions of the
INA30 and the fact that the number of aliens being admitted was determined
outside of congressional control,3 ' Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980.32
A. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 1980 (1980 Act) gives United States refugee law a meas-
ure of regularity, and has brought it in line with the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), to which the United States acceded
in 1968. 3 3 As a party to the Protocol, the United States obligated itself to apply
the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees34 (1951 Convention), which the United States had not previously adopted.
35
21 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
22 INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976). See note 12 supra.
23 INA §§ 212, 241, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1976). See notes 14-15 supra.
24 INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976) originally gave the Attorney General authority to with-
hold the deportation of aliens who he felt would be faced with physical persecution if returned to their
home country. It was amended to read "persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion."
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 918 (1965).
25 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, § 3,
added INA § 203(a)(7), the provision for seventh-preference refugees. Six percent of the overall numerical
quota was made available for refugees. Section 203(a)(7) limited refugee status to those who "because of
persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion . .. have fled (I) from
any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the general
area of the Middle East, . . . are unable or unwilling to return to such country or area on account of race,
religion or political opinion ... " or who were displaced by a natural calamity. This followed a period of
ad hoc legislation on refugee matters during which large groups of refugees had entered from Cuba and
Hungary. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1979, 18,
24, 46 [hereinafter cited as U.S. IMMIGRATION]. For a discussion of earlier specific legislation see C.
GORDON, supra note 1, at 2-183.
26 See note 25 supra.
27 See note 25 supra. This status was limited to six percent of the overall figure. Refugees having this
status could enter as conditional entrants and could obtain immigrant status after two years.
28 See INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), as amendedb y Pub. L. No. 960212, 94 Stat. 103
(1980). Parolees are granted temporary admission under procedures promulgated by the Attorney Gen-
eral in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1981). Parole had previously been used for large groups of aliens. The 1980 Act,
however, was intended to return parole to its original purpose of individual entry. U.S. IMMIGRATION,
supra note 25, at 18, 89; THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 HousE REPORT].
29 Asylum provisions prior to the 1980 Act derived from the Attorney General's power under INA
§ 103,8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976), to administer the immigration system. 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28,
at 17.
30 Id at 2-3.
31 The parole and asylum powers vested in the Attorney General were not subject to the numerical
limits set by Congress for the seventh preference. Id at 11. Parole was being used for groups on a large
scale basis. Id at 3.
32 Supra note 3. Congress intended to provide a systematic refugee admissions policy, see id § 101(b),
and to return parole to its original purpose of admitting individuals rather than groups. 1979 HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 10.
33 HAITIAN EMIGRATION, supra note 11, at 2.
34 Id The Protocol had the effect of a treaty and hence the force of law, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, thus
providing an additional substantive base for refugee claims.
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The Protocol incorporates articles 2 through 35 of the 1951 Convention,3 6 with
article 33 the most relevant to this study.37 Article 33 of the Protocol states: "No
contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any mannner whatsoever to
the frontiers of any territory where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion."'3 8
Congress reinforced its adoption of the Protocol's provisions by adopting the
definition of refugee found in article 1 of the 1951 Convention. 39 A refugee is an
alien who faces persecution on one of five grounds: (1) race; (2) religion; (3)
nationality; (4) membership in a particular social group; or (5) political opin-
ion.4o
In passing the 1980 Act, Congress also expanded the availability of refugee
status to thousands more aliens than were covered by the previous law. While
prior law limited "seventh preference refugees" to 17,400 visas annually, the 1980
Act eliminated the seventh preference and increased the number of annual ad-
missions as "section 207" refugees to 50,000 per year for 1980, 1981, and 1982.4 1
The 50,000 total would be allocated among various refugee groups in accordance
with the 1980 Act.
42
Even with the increased number of visas available for section 207 refugee
admissions, some aliens who face persecution may still fall outside the provisions
of the 1980 Act because of full quotas or the lack of any quota for their specific
refugee group. To handle these aliens, the Act provided the first specific provi-
sions for asylum law in the United States. 43 Although asylum and refuge are
separate entities, they share a common bond in the definition of refugee. INA
section 208 states that the asylee must meet the definition of "refugee" found in
the INA.44 Despite this threshold similarity, however, important differences exist
between an asylee and a refugee. Differences lie in the lack of a quota for asylum
35 HAITIAN EMIGRATION, supra note 11, at 2.
36 Id
37 Article 32 prohibits the return of an alien lawfully within the country if the alien is a refugee. The
Haitians who come to the United States without visas are not lawfully within the country, and therefore
are not protected by article 32.
38 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, COLLECTION OF INTER-
NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUGEES 22-23 (2d ed. 1979).
39 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9. INA § 101 (a)(42) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42)) states:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion ....
40 INA § 101(a)(42) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
41 INA § 207(a) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)). The number can be increased
by the President if an increase is justified by "humanitarian concerns or if otherwise in the national inter-
est." Id § 207(a). See note 5 supra.
42 Admissions are to be allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United
States in accordance with a determination made by the President after appropriate consultation. Id
§ 207(a)(3).
43 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 17.
44 Section 208(a) reads: "[T]he alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General




entries and the limited duration of asylum status. 45 Asylum, therefore, provides a
distinct alternative for the alien who fails to gain entry as a "section 207" refugee.
III. Elements of Making an Asylum Claim
A. Persecution
In finding an alien to be an asylee, and hence a refugee, INA section
101(a)(42)(A) requires that the alien show that he faces, or has a well-founded
fear that he will face, persecution if returned to his home country. The term
persecution must therefore be defined. 46 Congress, unfortunately, failed to do so
in the 1980 Act or in previous legislation. It has been said to be too strong a term
to encompass minor inconveniences or disadvantages.4 7 But it is not so strong a
term as to require actual physical harm. 48 Courts have said that Congress must
at least have meant to give the term its normal meaning: "The infliction of suf-
fering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive."
'49
Because in all societies the treatment of various groups often differs, such
differences do not always amount to persecution. 50 Persecution instead compre-
hends consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person con-
cerned.5' Clearly, a threat to life or freedom on one of the five enumerated
grounds rises to the level of persecution.
52
B. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
Even more elusive than the concept of persecution is the problem of deter-
45 Asylees are granted such status on a yearly basis. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(e) (1981). Extensions may be
granted in yearly redeterminations. Id. Adjustment to the status of an alien admitted for permanent
residence is possible under INA § 209(b) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1159).
46 Persecution was originally limited to physical acts, supra note 24, which included confinement,
torture or death. Kalatjis v. Rosenberg, 305 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1962); Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507
(3d Cir. 1961). Removal of the "physical" limitation expanded the meaning of persecution, as it was no
longer necessary to show bodily harm. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1969). "Persecution"
clearly includes threats to life or freedom, In re Dunar, (Bd. Imm. App. 1973), No. 2192 but goes beyond
that to include lesser threats. Moghanian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 577 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir.
1978).
The courts have found persecution to be present in a variety of factual settings. See, e.g., Durvat v.
Henry, 297 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1961) ( conomic reprisals depriving all means of livelihood); Kovac v.
INS, 407 F.2d at 106 (economic reprisals causing substantial economic disadvantage); Rosa v. INS, 440
F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971) (government could not control mob which threatened the alien); Sovich v. Es-
perdy, 319 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1963) (long period of confinement for political crimes). The settings in
which persecution has been found not to be present are equally various. See, e.g., Blagiac v. Flagg, 304
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962) (loss of job for failure to join the communist party); Mac Caud v. INS, 500 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1974) (abuse by prison guards not countenanced by the government); Sovich v. Esperdy, 319
F.2d at 29 (dictum that a short period of confinement, even for a political crime, could not constitute
persecution). Clearly, a finding of persecution is a factual issue to be decided on the evidence presented in
each case.
47 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
48 Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970).
49 Id at 846; Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d at 107. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1685 (1965).
50 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UNHCR
HANDBOOK].
51 Id
52 Id at 14.
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mining what constitutes a well-founded fear.5 3 The concept involves a subjective
component and a qualifying requirement of objectivity.54 It allows for considera-
tion of the alien's belief as to what conditions would face him at home, but it also
requires that such beliefs have support in the objective situation found in the
alien's home country. 55 Fear is well-founded if it can be established that the
alien's presence has been, and would remain, intolerable in his country of origin,
or would become intolerable were he to return.
56
It is the alien who bears the burden of showing such a well-founded fear of
persecution. 57 He must show that he is unable or unwilling to avail himself of his
country's protection. 58 "Unable" implies circumstances beyond the alien's con-
trol,59 while "unwilling" refers to those who refuse to avail themselves of their
country's protection. 60 If such protection is available, and there is no reason for
the alien to be unwilling to avail himself of it, then the alien is not a refugee, and
not eligible for asylum.
6
1
Of all the reasons for an alien to leave a country or to be unwilling to return,
only one, a well-founded fear of persecution based on the specific grounds previ-
ously listed, has been chosen as the basis for an asylum claim. All other reasons
are irrelevant, 62 unless used to augment a claim of persecution, or to show the
circumstances that the alien would face at home.63 Thus asylum status does not
extend to those who are economically oppressed, 64 unless such economic oppres-
sion is due to the alien's persecuted status.
65
IV. Timing of the Asylum Claim
Asylum claims can be entered upon arrival on American soil, and virtually
anytime thereafter. 66 The availabililty of asylum, however, may be related to the
53 Because the term "well-founded fear" is new to the refugee definition, there are few reported deci-
sions construing it. Prior cases tried to determine the relationship of the term to the term then used, "clear
probability." Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977), held the two terms to be essentially the same,
in that both required a showing that the applicant (I) participated in certain conduct and (2) would be
persecuted because of it. Id. at 380. Other courts held that the language required the alien to be a victim
of actual persecution or to show good reason why he was threatened by it. In re Dunar, No. 2192, at 15-16.
More recently, the language of Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977), and the congressional
adoption of the U.N. Protocol definition of refugee, supra note 39, clearly indicate that the terms "well-
founded fear" and "clear probability" have distinctive meanings, with the former term more subjective
than the latter. The parameters of "well-founded fear," however, are not yet clear.
54 UNHOR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 11.
55 Id
56 Id at 12-13.
57 Fluerinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 1978); Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir.
1977); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1977); 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1981).




62 Id at 12.
63 Id
64 HAITIAN EMIGRATION, supra note 22, at 11. Because Haitians are seen as fleeing Haiti for economic
reasons, id at 3, they are not regarded as political refugees by the INS or the State Department. Haitian
Refugee Center v. Civiletti, Record at 41.
65 HAITIAN EMIGRATION, supra note 11, at 11; UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 16.
66 Both persons seeking admission to the United States and those already present are eligible to claim
asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a) (1981). The asylum claim of an alien already present in the United States
usually arises in connection with deportation proceedings brought against him, as in the case of an illegal




time at which the events underlying the asylum claim arose. Three periods pres-
ent themselves: (1) the time while the alien is present in his home country; (2)
the time following the alien's departure and preceding his first asylum claim; and
(3) the time following the first unsuccessful asylum claim.
The first period 6 7 which lasts until the alien leaves his home country, 68 is
explicitly included in INA section 101(a) (42) (A). The group included in this pe-
riod includes those who have actually been persecuted. Aliens in this group have
clearly established their claim based on preexisting facts. Alternatively, many
aliens fear persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in
a social group, or political opinion. They are also eligible for asylum under the
language of INA section 101(a) (42) (A).
The alien's claim, however, may be based on circumstances such as a change
of government at home, political activity while abroad, or the act of illegal de-
parture,69 which raise a fear of persecution that begins after the alien has left his
home country. These claims fall into the second category. The time period in-
volved may be extremely short, if asylum is sought upon arrival, or very long, if
asylum is sought after an extended stay, perhaps while facing deportation.
Under any of these circumstances, once an asylum claim is first served, the third
period begins.
During this third period one last issue remains. Can this alien, who has
sought and been denied asylum, enter a renewed asylum claim based upon a fear
of persecution because his first asylum claim has been considered a political state-
ment at home?
A. Refugees Sur Place
Refugees who fall into the second and third time periods are known as
refugees sztr place.70 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) holds that an alien who becomes a refugee only after leaving his coun-
try of origin is a refugee surplace. This may be a result of the alien's actions or it
may be due to circumstances arising in his home country during his absence.
71
Regard should be given to whether such actions will come to the attention of the
alien's home government and what the government's reaction will be.
72
The United Nations' position has been adopted with some changes by the
decisions of United States courts. 73 The cases have looked at two factors in deter-
mining the overall validity of the claim: the degree to which the alien was politi-
cally active at home and the alien's motive for leaving his home country.
67 Any Haitian who can meet his burden of proof based on conditions before he left Haiti faces no
further problem. Most have failed to meet this burden, however. See note II su ra. It is necessary to
determine if those who have failed have become refugees since they left Haiti.
68 The alien must be "outside any country of his nationality, or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, . . . outside any country in which such person last habitually resided. ... INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A) (amended 1980) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)(A)).
69 Of course, aliens entering the country legally are eligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 108.1 (1981).
See also note 8 supra.
70 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 22.
71 Id
72 Id
73 See notes 74-89 infra and accompanying text.
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1. Prior Political Activity
Two Ninth Circuit decisions illustrate the value of showing prior political
activity when making an asylum claim. In Kovac v. INS,7 4 the Ninth Circuit
considered an alien's prior political activity as a factor in granting asylum. The
case involved a Yugoslav merchant seaman 75 who claimed that he faced persecu-
tion because he had jumped ship,76 which was an illegal departure.7 7 The court
upheld Kovac's claim, but distinguished his case from that of an alien who had
no prior political activity.7 8 The court also noted Kovac's fear of persecution
because of his Hungarian nationality, which provided an additional ground for
asylum.
7 9
Conversely, in Hosseinardi v. INS,80 an Iranian student who had only begun
to criticize his home government after leaving Iran was denied asylum. The
Ninth Circuit noted the alien's lack of political activity at home and upheld the
denial of his asylum claim.8 1
2. The Motive Test
A standard similar to that used by the Ninth Circuit in Kovac and Hos-
seinardi was applied by the Fifth Circuit in Paulv. INS.82 The court required the
alien, a Haitian, to show (1) that his departure was politically motivated, and
(2) that he faced persecution for political reasons upon his return to Haiti.
8 3
The United States view seems to require the alien to show that he had en-
gaged in some prior political activity84 and that his flight from his home country
was in part politically motivated. 85 Where the evidence of probable persecution
is less than clear, courts use the political motive requirement to distinguish suc-
cessful and unsuccessful applications.86 Generally, the successful applicants are
those who can show political acts. Of course, the act of leaving the home country
might itself be seen as a political act, especially if done with political overtones.
The decision in Coriolan v. INS 8 7 seems to open the door for such a claim by
illegal departees. In Coriolan, the Fifth Circuit referred to earlier illegal depar-
ture cases and extended their holdings to cases in which the alien may not have
engaged in prior political activity at home.8 8 In Coriolan, two Haitians who had
illegally entered the United States sought review of the denial of their asylum
74 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
75 d at 104.
76 Id
77 Id
78 Id at 105.
79 Id at 104.
80 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968).
81 Id
82 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
83 Id. at 196-97.
84 Most Haitians had not been politically active in their home country, although some spoke of
problems with the Haitian secret police, the Ton Ton Macoute, and of executions of some of their rela-
tives. Note, Behind the Paper Curtain, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 107, 123-25 (1978). The State
Department views the Macoute's actions as private banditry and not government persecution. HAITIAN
EMIGRATION, supra note 11, at 11.
85 See note 64 supra.
86 Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
87 Id
88 Id at 1000. See notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text.
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requests.8 9 Though they offered conflicting testimony, neither alien had a sub-
stantiated claim of prior political activity. 90 Nonetheless, the court reversed the
earlier denial of the asylum applications and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.9 1
B. Persecution Versus Prosecution
One of the difficulties presented in the case of refugees surplace is determin-
ing whether punishment for an illegal departure or for acts committed while the
alien was abroad is prosecution or persecution. In questioning the validity of the
motive test,92 the Fifth Circuit in Coriolan expressed concern that the test did not
consider the government's motive in punishing the alien.93 Since the government
administers the punishment, logic requires that the focus be on the government's
motives for such punishment. The difficulty lies in drawing the line where pun-
ishment for an illegal act (prosecution) becomes repression for a political act or
the expression of a political opinion (persecution). In differentiating between
prosecution and persecution, three factors seem relevant: (1) the presence of a
valid, nonpolitical law; (2) the nature of the judicial system involved; and (3)
conformity to human rights standards.
1. Presence of a Valid Nonpolitical Law
Persons who flee prosecution are not refugees.94 Immigration law protects
those who flee injustice, not valid prosecution. 95 Even where punishment is polit-
ically motivated, it must be considered whether the punishment conforms to the
general law of the nation involved. 96 If so, such punishment alone does not make
the alien a refugee.9 7 Congress did not intend to extend asylum to common
criminals or to fugitives from justice.98 However, punishment of some crimes
lacking the element of moral turpitude often serves as a vehicle for persecution. 99
Specifically, many illegal departure crimes are the products of deep political
motivations. 0 0 In rejanus andjanek 10 dealt with Hungary's political application
of an illegal departure statute. In that case, the Board of Immigration Appeals
held that the home country's punishment was persecution for political opin-
ion,'0 2 and granted the asylum claim.
2. Nature of the Judicial System
The need to consider the nature of the judicial system in an alien's home
89 559 F.2d at 995.
90 Id at 995-996.
91 Id at 1004.
92 Judge Tuttle questioned whether previous decisions requiring a political motive for departure
would still control. Id at 1000.
93 Id
94 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 15.
95 Id
96 Id at 20.
97 Id
98 Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1963).
99 Id.
100 Id
101 Cited in Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d at 839, 842.
102 Id
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country is almost inseparable from the need to look at the law involved. Punish-
ment for a recognized offense of a nonpolitical nature is not persecution if it is
administered under a recognized judicial system.10 3 The lack of a judicial system
or the lack of trials and criminal safeguards, however, would undermine any
claim that the punishment faced by the alien was prosecution rather than perse-
cution. 1
04
3. Conformity to Human Rights Standards
Conformity to the nation's general law and the presence of a protective judi-
cial system does not eliminate the possibility that the alien faces persecution.
The law involved must also conform to human rights standards and be applied
uniformly. 105 It cannot single out political opponents for harsh treatment. 106 In
addition, the type and length of punishment is relevant. 10 7 In Sovich v. Esperdy,'°8
an illegal departure case, the Second Circuit held that incarceration under an
illegal departure statute is not persecution if the period of detention is brief, but
that it will be persecution where the detention is for a long period of time, or for
life. 109
C. Persecution for Making an Asylum Claim
Although not all illegal departures raise the fear of persecution so as to jus-
tify granting an alien asylum, claims are often made based on such an expecta-
tion. If the government grants the asylum claim, the alien no longer fears
persecution. If the claim is denied, however, the alien may claim that he is now
subject to persecution because his asylum claim was seen as a political statement
or, as in the case of the Haitians, caused him to be regarded as a traitor."10
In Kovac v. IVS,"'I the Ninth Circuit said that an alien could base his asylum
claim on a fear of persecution arising from his first claim. 112 Kovac involved an
alien who had engaged in prior political activity, however, as well as a claim
based on nationality. 1 3 It must be distinguished from the case of an alien who
has no prior activity and no claim of persecution before his original asylum claim
was made. No United States'court has yet decided if a request for asylum, stand-
ing alone, constitutes a political act sufficient to justify a subsequent grant of
asylum.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) holds that
a person becomes a refugee whenever he first fits the definition of that term. A
103 Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d at 28.
104 The Haitian legal system has been said to be nonexistent. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,
Record at 100. Few protections exist, and Haitians often face imprisonment without trial. Id. at 51. The
lack of criminal courts in Haiti tends to undermine any claim that punished returnees are simply being
prosecuted within an established criminal system. Interview with Claus Feldman of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in South Bend, Indiana (Sep. 15, 1980).
105 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 16.
106 Id
107 Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d (2d Cir. 1963).
108 Id
109 Id
110 Supra note 17.
111 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).




court's recognition of refugee status-does not make a person a refugee; it merely
acknowledges his preexisting status." 14 The UNHCR states that eligibility must
occur prior to the time when the alien's status is determined." t
5
Congress has declared that the purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 is to
respond to the needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands.' 16 The
alien must be unable or unwilling (with a proper reason) to return to his home-
land. In the situation considered here, the alien might have been able to return
had he not made the original asylum claim. Also, prior to making his original
asylum claim, the alien may have had no reason recognized under the 1980 Act
to be unwilling to return. Like the UNHCR, Congress has evidenced an intent
to restrict asylum to those who are eligible when they first apply. The grant of
asylum recognizes an existing status; it is not meant to create one.
Asylum law protects those who in good faith need to be sheltered from per-
secution. This protection was not meant to encompass those who make political
statements for the sole purpose of becoming refugees. In Cistemas-Estay v. INS,, 1
7
the asylum claims of two Chileans failed. The court found that the statements
made by those aliens were made for the sole purpose of making themselves eligi-
ble for asylum.' ' The two had no reason to fear persecution before they staged a
press conference, 1 9 and the court refused to find that the statements made were
sufficient to create a valid asylum claim.120 The same situation is presented by
the alien who, with no prior asylum eligibility, makes an asylum claim solely for
the purpose of justifying a subsequent asylum claim. The results should not dif-
fer. 1
2
V. The Haitian Situation
The Haitian situation presents a multifaceted issue. Some Haitians may
claim asylum based on persecution experienced firsthand while still in Haiti. For
these people, the only problem is meeting the burden of proof placed upon them.
Unfortunately, most have not been able to do so.
122
There are also Haitians whose fear of persecution stems from their illegal
departure from Haiti. 123 They are also eligible for asylum under the Coriolan
decision and the United States and UNHCR positions. 124 For these people, the
problem is also one of meeting the burden of proof. Unlike those who must prove
114 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 9.
115 Id
116 The 1980 Act states in § 101(a): "Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States
to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands.
117 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
118 Id at 159.
119 Id
120 Id at 160.
121 One problem that might arise in denying the asylum claim is that the unsuccessful asylum appli-
cant may still argue that he is eligible for withholding of deportation under INA § 243(h). Since the
actual deportation takes place after the asylum claim is denied, although the deportation hearing may be
the same as the asylum hearing, 8 C.F.R. § 208.10 (1981), an alien subject to persecution based on his
asylum claim might be able to claim that he was a refugee at the time of his section 243(h) claim. To
allow such a backdoor approach would seem to defeat both the holding of C,,lerzas-Estay, 531 F.2d 155,
and the concepts underlying asylum.
122 See note 11 supra.
123 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, Record at 46.
124 See notes 87-109 sup ra.
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actual persecution, however, the burden on these people is to show a well-
founded fear of future persecution. These Haitians have also failed, for the most
part, to meet their burden of proof.'
25
One group which has suffered a pattern of persecution consists of those who
have been returned to Haiti after making an asylum claim here. 126 If no valid
grounds for the claim exist, asserting the claim does not make the alien an asylee.
However, those making the asylum claim may face a real danger in Haiti if their
claim is refused. The tactics of a government in punishing asylum-seekers can
have a chilling impact on those who would otherwise seek asylum. Those with
close cases may not choose to take the chance.
VI. Conclusion
The solution to the dilemma confronted here must protect the oppressed
while denying asylum to those without bona fide fears. The solution must recog-
nize the limited nature of asylum. Therefore, when faced with an asylum claim
based on a previous unsuccessful claim, the courts must determine (1) the appli-
cant's background and conditions in his country of origin, (2) whether the first
asylum claim had a good faith, substantive basis, and (3) whether the first asylum
claim was simply a bootstrap for the second asylum claim.
Like the concept of well-founded fear, this inquiry will involve the use of
both objective and subjective standards, But, as was done in Cfternas-Estay, the
courts must at times inquire into the good faith of the alien and of his political
acts. To do otherwise would do injustice to the competing values of asylum-
relief and restriction.
Kenneth R. Petrini
125 See note 11 supra.
126 Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, Record at 46.
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